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Young, Jeffrey S., Purdue University, December 2014. Competition between Private 
Labels and National Brands: Empirical Evidence from Homescan Data on Fluid Milk 




 The purpose of this study is to empirically examine the nature of the pricing 
relationship between private labels (or “store brands”) and national brands. To 
accomplish this, we control for the exogenous variation in the farm price of a commodity 
that serves as the main agricultural input common to both private labels and national 
brands (any shocks to this farm price will pass through to both retail prices – private label 
and retail). The product of choice is fluid milk, as the farm price of milk comprises a 
large share of producer and retailer cost.  
Two examples of underlying theories concerning this relationship are that (1) the 
introduction of private labels into a market lowers relative national brand prices, and (2) 
the introduction of private labels raises the relative national brand prices. The intuition 
following these two theories about private label/national brand competition tells us the 
patterns we should look for in the farm-to-retail price transmissions – whether relative 
national brand prices rise or fall. Hence, the models we estimate are standard price 
transmission models, each appropriate under specific assumptions about the data. 
We obtain results that are inconsistent with either of the chosen theories. 
Furthermore, the results are robust across model specification. Within the results, we do 
observe that for small number of markets, the price transmission patterns for private 
labels are statistically different from those of national brands. Using Chow tests, these 






 Finally, we estimate the models again using private label retail prices from 
retailers for whom private labels are a relatively larger share of sales, and private label 
prices from retailers for whom private labels are a relatively lower share of sales. On 
average, we observe no difference in price-setting by retailers who feature national 










In the latter half of the 20th century, the larger food retailers introduced their own 
versions of the products they were selling. Typically referred to as “store brand” or, as in 
this paper, “private label” goods, they were put under the store’s own label and were 
priced considerably lower than the branded products (firms can avoid double 
marginalization with private labels, which is not the case with national brands). 
 There has been much speculation about the effect this introduction of private label 
competition has had on the pricing of nationally branded products. Certainly, it gives 
more options to consumers, and produces savings for those who view the two as 
substitutes of one another. However, no single speculation or theory regarding this effect 
has emerged.  
 
1.2 Previous Studies 
Two predominant competing views of this relationship persist: One view, which 
may be termed the “competitive view”, is that lower-priced private labels provide an 
incentive for the national brands to lower their prices in order to remain competitive. As a 
consequence, retail prices for national brands are lower under private label competition 





A more recent view, to which we refer as the “market segmentation view”1, 
introduced by Ward et al. (2002) is that, if anything, the introduction of private labels 
leads to higher branded prices. Ward et al. used IRI scanner data from grocery stores to 
estimate the effects of private label prices on the pricing of national brand food products 
and found that branded prices actually rose with the introduction of private labels. A 
possible explanation is that since retailers earn higher margins on their own brands2, they 
have an incentive to induce buyers to switch from national brands. It is the retailers who 
have the ultimate pricing power, so they have an incentive to raise branded prices 
(regardless of what the branded manufacturer does), causing some customers to switch 
and raising the margin on those with more inelastic demands, who do not switch (Perloff 
et al., 2012). 
 Steiner (2004) investigated the nature and benefits of the competition between 
private label and national brand prices. His main argument is that it is the retailers who 
set the ultimate shelf price; thus, in order to make their private label goods more 
appealing to consumers who may consider private label goods to be of lower quality than 
branded goods, they exercise their pricing power to force national brand manufacturers to 
lower their prices. Furthermore, the study finds that consumer welfare is maximized 
when private labels and national brands are competing, rather than when one is more 
dominant than the other. Three incentives are presented as the primary reasons retailers 
1 The term “segmentation” may bring about some ambiguity. By this, we do not mean that the market is 
split into two new markets, but rather the pool of consumers is segmented into those with relatively elastic 
demand and those with relatively inelastic demand. By retailers forcing consumers to face higher branded 
prices, those consumers who take these prices as given and continue to purchase branded products, they 
identify themselves as consumers who are less price-sensitive. 
2 Because of double marginalization, retailers have no manufacturer-set markups to pay on private label 
goods, so the retailers’ margin from retail markup can be larger while still keeping the private label price 
lower than the branded price. 
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create private label products to compete with national brands: (1) Short term 
subsidization of private label products could actually be profitable in the long run, (2) 
Sale prices for private label goods are more profitable than promoting national brands, 
and (3) Retailers that have a strong, well-established private label possess more leverage 
with national brand manufacturers to barter for price concessions on the branded products 
sold to them by those manufacturers. 
 Wolinsky (1987) looked at a basic duopoly model concerning two brands and the 
competition between them. To begin, he examined the net surplus (benefit less the cost of 
obtaining one unit of the preferred brand) of an individual. With this being established, he 
claimed (and proves in the appendix) that for a concave utility function, there exists a 
symmetric equilibrium, and characterizes it in a system of three equations. Post-analysis, 
the study concluded that retailers market both national brand and private label products in 
order to price discriminate, exploiting consumers’ imperfect information about products 
as well as their variation in preferences. When different firms produce their own brand, 
this is found to be consistent with what results from non-cooperative interactions between 
the firms.  
While studying the interactions between privately-labeled and nationally-branded 
pricing using data from the recession in 2007-2009, Volpe (2011) found that, on average, 
private label foods are priced 23% lower than the national brand equivalents, both with 
and without promotions or sales. Volpe also found that prices of private labels and 
national brands were converging, which seems to support the competitive view of the 






1.3 Empirical Approach 
Given that the effect of private labels on the prices of nationally branded 
equivalents is theoretically ambiguous, we turn to the data to shed empirical evidence on 
the interactions between prices of private labels and national brands. The preferred 
approach to evaluating this relationship would be to examine national brand prices before 
and after private labels’ appearance, but the data showing prices before private labels’ 
introduction is unavailable to us. In other words, we do not have any exogenous variation 
in the national brand prices due to the prevalence of private labels. Another direct method 
would be analyzing how the prices of national brand products differ across stores and 
cities with and without private labels. However, private labels are ubiquitous throughout 
all aspects of our data, and we cannot obtain any meaningful cross-sectional variation in 
national brand prices. 
Our empirical application is to the fluid milk market in select U.S. cities, using 
data from the Nielsen Homescan panel. Building on the literature on farm-retail price 
transmission, our empirical specification models the responses of prices of national 
brands and private labels to shocks to farm prices of milk. We then draw inference on 
competition between national brands and private labels from the responses of retail prices 










2.1 Retail and Farm Milk Prices 
 We use data from two sources. All retail price data are from the Nielsen 
Homescan data set, which enlists households3 to record all grocery purchase data at an 
item level with corresponding price, brand, and store information. In this paper we 
consider fluid milk in gallons, the most common fluid milk volume, from 2004-2010. The 
farm prices are the regulated Class 1 price that milk plants must pay for milk sold in fluid 
uses. The original data are from USDA Agricultural Marketing Service; we extracted 
these data from Prof. Brian Gould’s Understanding Dairy Markets website, which 
collects dairy data from various public agencies. 
Nielsen Homescan data is from a nationally representative sample covering 52 
markets (similar to Metropolitan Statistical Areas) and 9 remaining/regional markets to 
cover the continental US4. The retailer types were restricted to supermarkets (or 
supercenters), groceries, and food clubs. We excluded health food stores, pharmacies, gas 
stations, and convenience stores because the price-setting policies of such establishments
depend on other additional characteristics that would make these retailers incomparable 
to the retailers we chose to examine in our data.  
3 Due to oversampling in some markets, the number of households in a city does not reflect population 
directly; for instance, in 2010, the number of households in a market ranged from 272 households in Des 
Moines to 1,991 households in Chicago. 
4 With between 20-50 counties in metropolitan areas. Only the subset of 52 US cities is used in the analysis. 
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By far the most common milk product in the data was 2%, non-organic, non-
flavored, fluid milk sold in gallons. This dataset contained nearly 3 million observations. 
The second most popular specification was non-organic, non-flavored, fluid skim milk in 
gallons – about 2 million observations. For reasons set forth below to further improve on 
this, we aggregated all milk into gallons – ignoring any differences across fat content – 
for our computations. This new dataset contained about 6 million observations. We do 
not believe this aggregation causes any problems because the price of the aggregated 
milk types differs very little from that of two percent milk (Figure 2.1), the most 
commonly purchased milk type in the data.
 
Figure 2.1. Average Monthly Retail Prices ($/FlOz) for skim, 1%, 2%, and Whole Milk 
sold in Gallons and all Milk sold in Gallons, United States, January 2004-December 2010 





2.2 Data Subsets 
Ideally, we would have price series for each brand sold in each store for all 52 
markets, including the series of each store’s private label prices. However, due to data 
limitations5, we performed our analysis at the market level. That is, we aggregate all 
private label milk prices from all retailers in a market and create an average monthly 
price for private label milk for each market. The same process is followed for branded 
milk, aggregating all non-private label brands from all stores in each market, computing 
the average monthly national brand milk price for every market. To calculate these 
monthly average retail price series, we restricted the computation process in that a market 
must have at least 5 observations for private label sales and 5 observations for branded 
sales in each month. With this threshold in place, 51 of the 52 markets qualified for our 
analysis6. In these 51 markets, we have a total of 3 monthly time series – the average 
private label retail price for that market, the average national brand retail price for that 
market, and the class I farm price for the relevant USDA federal milk marketing order. 
 As a follow-up, we look on a finer level by examining the response of private 
label milk prices from different retailers. For each firm that is in a market, the retail price 
of that firm includes all branches of that firm within that particular city. To this end, we 
select all retailers in all markets who have at least 5 observations per month of private 
label milk sales. This gives us a total of 240 retailers, which we subset into 120 retailers 
who sell relatively more national brands and 120 who sell relatively fewer brands. These 
5 Because private labels are so dominant in the fluid milk market, our data has drastically fewer 
observations for transactions of branded milk. Hence, with this data, we are unable to perform our analysis 
at the brand-firm level. 
6 San Diego had several instances of no observations of branded milk in 2005-2006. 
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240 retailers are scattered throughout 49 of the 52 total markets (US cities) in the Nielsen 
data; each city contains 5 different retailers from this group on average – Philadelphia 
and Washington, DC topping the list with 11 and 10 different retailers, respectively. 
We convert all prices to dollars per fluid oz.7 in order to directly compare the 
retail and farm prices. The resulting data set consists of 84 monthly observations on each 
of the major private labels and national brands in each of our regional markets. Our time 
units are in months because the farm price changes monthly. 
To exclude organic milk from our data, we set all indicator variables to delete any 
observations that might be organic milk. However, there were some bugs in the data that 
brought in outliers that could be organic milk accidentally recorded as non-organic8. 
There were also outliers where the price had been recorded as $0.00, but no coupon was 
used, and no promotion was offered by the store where the milk was purchased. In order 
to counteract the problem of these outliers – both high and low – we removed the top 5% 
and the bottom 5% of the prices for every market, and then averaged the data as we had 
intended, thus virtually eliminating the issue of outliers. 
Table A1 presents simple, firm-level summary statistics for the Chicago and 
Boston markets. Prices of national brands are, on average, higher than those of the 
corresponding private labels. The same is true on the market level (Figures 2.2, 2.3), as 
well as the national level (Figure 2.4). 
 
7 Since the prices recorded in the Homscan data are prices paid by the consumer, we factored in any 
promotions and added back any coupon values to the price, ergo obtaining the actual shelf price set by the 
store in which the milk was purchased. 
8 These observations had exceedingly high prices consistent with those of the organic milk observations. 
 
 




Figure 2.2: Average Monthly Retail Prices and Regional Rarm Price ($/FlOz) for Milk 
sold in Gallons, Chicago, January 2004-December 2010 (source: Author’s Calculations 
from Nielsen Homescan and USDA-NASS Data). 
 
 Notice that, in Figure 2.2, the average private label retail price very briefly jumps 
above the average national brand retail price in Chicago, but then returns back to the 
original pattern of the national brand price remaining the highest and continues in that 







Figure 2.3: Average Monthly Retail Prices and Regional Farm Price ($/FlOz) for Milk 
sold in Gallons, Minneapolis, January 2004-December 2010 (source: Author’s 
Calculations from Nielsen Homescan and USDA-NASS Data). 
 
 In Figure 2.3, we see the same pattern holding more consistently in Minneapolis, 
as well as in several other markets (seen in Figures B1-B3), and on a national level 
(Figure 2.4). Table A2 verifies this pattern in a majority of US cities given by the 







Figure 2.4: Average Monthly Retail Prices and Regional Farm Price ($/FlOz) for Milk 
sold in Gallons, United States, January 2004-December 2010 (source: Author’s 
Calculations from Nielsen Homescan and USDA-NASS Data). 
 
We now turn to an econometric analysis for a more formal exploration of the 










3.1 Empirical Motivation 
Our goal is to assess the two competing theories on competition between private 
labels and national brands by examining the effects of (exogenous) changes in the farm 
price of milk on the changes on retail prices of private labels and national brands. More 
generally, we investigate the existence of strategic pricing behavior of retailers.  
If the competitive view is correct, then we would predict a pattern of pass-through 
that causes prices of national brands and private labels to converge. That is, if the retail 
prices respond to farm price shocks in a way that lowers the relative national brand price, 
then this is certainly consistent with this view. However, if the market segmentation view 
holds, then we would expect a pattern of pass-through that drives up the price of the 
national brand relative to that of the private label. Either of these require different price 
transmission patterns for private labels and national brands. 
 As part of his study of pass-through of increases in commodity and wholesale 
prices to retail prices, Leibtag (2009) estimated the relationship between farm, wholesale, 
and retail prices for a range of food items. For fluid milk he finds that between 5% and 





months. Therefore, our lag length of choice follows the convention of 5 months. 
However, Leibtag does not address the potential for differential price responses for 
national brands and private labels. 
 Given that farm prices can be transmitted asymmetrically (ie, farm price increases 
are passed through to retail prices differently than farm price decreases), Capps and 
Sherwell (2007) investigate using two standard asymmetric price transmission models. 
The first is the standard Houck (1977) model developed as a test for asymmetry, and the 
second is a modification of this model that allows for cointegration between the retail and 
farm price series. 
 While Capps and Sherwell (2007) use only two pre-specified models to test for 
asymmetry, von Cramon-Taubadel and Loy (1996) formulate a survey of models that are 
used to detect asymmetric price transmission. Two of the models used in the Capps and 
Sherwell (2007) study are presented in detail in the survey. 
 
3.2 Time-Series Econometric Modelling 
 Because our data is purely time-series, any model we build will depend on time-
series properties such as stationarity, serial correlation, cointegration, etc. Standard unit 
root tests on the natural logs of the price series indicated that most of the series followed 
unit root processes. However, to proceed under the assumption that all prices follow unit 
root processes is risky. Unit root tests can often be inconclusive; hence, we construct 
multiple models, each of which is appropriate under its own unique set of assumptions 




Each equation is estimated 51 times – once for each market; also, each model is 
estimated twice in each market – once for private label retail prices, once for national 
brand prices. In all cases, the extent of the difference between the two is tested using 
Chow tests. We also use the Swamy method of random coefficients – as presented in 
Greene (2003) – to estimate the equations. 
 
3.2.1 Model 1 – Stationary Time Series 
 Our first model is in levels, operating under the key assumption of no unit root 
processes. It takes the form 
  (1)          = + +  
where  {  ,  }. 
For this model, we regress the current retail price on the current farm price to 
estimate the contemporaneous effect of changes in the farm price. With this, we can 
determine whether private labels or national brands are more responsive to these farm 
price shocks.  
 
3.2.2 Model 2 – Introduce Asymmetry 
One should note that this symmetric transmission model assumes that the 
response to increases in the farm prices is equivalent to the response to decreases in the 
farm price. However, if farm prices are transmitted asymmetrically to retail prices, then 





We allow for this using the standard Houck (1977) model which was developed primarily 
to test for asymmetry 
(3)          = +  ( ) ( ) +  ( ) ( ) +  
where  {  ,  }, 
( ) =  ,  >0, , 
( ) =  ,  <0, . 
In the standard Houck model, the dependent variable  is the sum of the first 
differenced price  across all time periods ; simplifying the series, the middle terms 
cancel each other out, leaving us with the current price  and the initial price . In other 
words, the dependent variable  is simply the current price less the initial price, ie, =  for each time period . 
With this model, we can estimate the pass-through of both increases and 
decreases in the farm price to the retail prices. Another advantage of this specification is 
that we can perform joint F-tests for asymmetric price transmission. For this model, we 
make no assumptions about whether the series follow unit root processes as the variables 
are in differences by model specification. However, we are assuming that no price series 







3.2.3 Model 3 – Asymmetry & Cointegration 
This leads us to the third and final model, developed by von Cramon-Taubadel & 
Loy (1996) which takes the Houck (1977) model and allows for cointegration between 
the retail and farm prices. In this case, we are assuming nonstationary time series and 
cointegration between the retail and farm prices. 
The competitive view of private label and national brand competition suggests 
that prices of prices of private labels would be more responsive to changes in farm prices, 
as national brand prices are being restrained from rising too much under the competition. 
Furthermore, if private labels make brands more competitive, then we might expect less 
asymmetry for brands since competitive behavior could imply no asymmetry.  
The market segmentation view suggests that retailers would use changes in the 
farm price to increase the price of national brands relative to the price of private labels. In 
order to accommodate the market segmentation view, the standard error correction model 
requires some modification. Following Capps and Sherwell (2007), we extend the error 
correction with Houck-type decompositions of lagged prices and the lagged error 
correction term. The resulting model is as follows: 
(4)       = +  ( ) ( ) +  ( ) ( ) + ( ) ( )
+ ( ) ( ) +  
where  {  ,  }, 





( ) =  ,  <0, , 
( ) =  ,  > 00, , 
( ) =  ,  < 00, , 
and  is the lagged residual of the  cointegrating regression, or =
 from equation (1). The dependent variable  is the same “Houck” 
differenced price as in the previous model (initial retail price subtracted from current 
retail price).  
The error correction term is the speed of adjustment of the long-run equilibrium 
relationship (also called the cointegrating regression, seen above) between the retail and 
farm prices. If the error correction term is negative in period , then we know that, 
according to the long-run equilibrium between the farm and retail prices, the retail price 
is below equilibrium and/or the farm price is above equilibrium. Including the error 
correction terms accounts for the cointegration that seems to be present in the farm and 
retail prices, as seen in figures 2, 3, and 4. We also benefit in that we segment the error 
correction term into positive and negative adjustments – another test for asymmetry. 
In order to assess farm-retail price transmission, we use the estimated error 
correction model to compute and plot the impulse response functions showing changes 
over time to the prices of private labels and national brands in response to a shock to the 
class 1 farm price.  
For a follow-up analysis, we use the firm-level data and again estimate all of our 





strategy that is consistent with either of the competitive view or the market segmentation 
view exists, then it is reasonable to expect it to show in the responses of the different 
types of retailers – those who largely feature national brands and those who do not. If 
private labels compete in any way, then retailers without branded milk will have no such 










4.1 Model 1 Results (PL vs NB) 
 When we estimate the first model, we detect evidence of serial correlation in 
nearly every market using Breuch-Godfrey tests. Hence, this prompted some re-
specification of the model, specifically, including the lagged dependent variable and 
several lags of the independent variable 
(2)          = + +  +  
 where  {  ,  }. 
With this new specification, we can account for the timing of pass-through – following 
the fashion of Leibtag (2009) – and also calculate the long-run effect 
 of changes in the farm price on the  retail price. The  for 
OLS ranges from 0.84 to 0.98 for the model run on private labels, and 0.69 to 0.95 for the 
model run on national brands. The  for the Swamy method is 0.96 for private labels 






Table 4.1: Model 1 Parameter Estimates (Equation (2) using PL and NB prices by 
market). 
 Private Label National Brand 
Variable Mean > 2 < 2 Random Mean > 2 < 2 Random 
 0.863 51 0 0.874 0.841 51 0 0.856 
 0.296 49 0 0.295 0.262 46 0 0.256 
 -0.154 0 17 -0.157 -0.100 0 12 -0.103 
 0.010 1 0 0.006 -0.003 1 0 -0.003 
 0.006 2 2 0.006 0.028 2 1 0.026 
 0.020 1 1 0.018 0.005 2 0 0.003 
 -0.018 0 1 -0.021 -0.002 0 2 -0.005 
 1.158 42 0 1.162 1.195 43 0 1.213 
 
Table 4.1 presents the results of each equation – model 1 for private label prices, 
and model 1 for national brand prices. Each equation was estimated 51 times (once for 
each market) and Swamy random coefficient estimation (Greene 2003) was used to 
compute the (weighted) average effect across the 51 markets (under the column labelled 
“Random”). This table also shows an unweighted average, or the mean of the 51 markets 
(under the column labelled “Mean”). The Swamy random coefficient estimation was 
chosen as it is a more conservative estimate than OLS (and more accurate) with regards 
to statistical significance. The estimation across all markets is, at its essence, a weighted 
average of the individual OLS estimates where each estimate is weighted by its variance. 
This procedure estimates the mean effect while still accounting for these random 
individual noise components in each market. Written in equation form, the assumption 
is  = +  where  is the mean of the  coefficient,  is the estimate of that 
mean in market i, and  is a mean-zero random noise variable unique to the same 





plus random noise from market i. The advantage of also estimating the price transmission 
parameters using Swamy is that the estimated variances are usually larger than if we use 
pooled OLS instead, hence obtaining a more conservative estimate. 
The effect of the current farm price is positive and significant (at the 5% 
significance level) in 49 out of 51 markets for private labels, and 46 out of 51 markets for 
national brands, as indicated by the column “ > 2”, and never negative and significant, 
as indicated by the column “ < 2”. Comparing this to the number of significant 
markets for all other parameters, the majority of the farm price is passed through 
contemporaneously, so the coefficient on the current farm price is the parameter of 
interest. Also seen in table 4.1, for a $1 increase in the farm price of milk at time t, we see 
a $0.29 increase in the private label retail price, compared to a $0.25 increase in the 
national brand retail price. This tells us that, at least in the short-run, farm price shocks 
impact private label prices and national brand prices in a very similar way (although the 
effect on private labels is slightly larger), which is inconsistent with any theory stating 
that retailers use private labels as a strategic device against national brand products. 
Now we turn to the long-run problem. The long-run effect of changes in the farm 
price on private labels is, on average, 1.16 (statistically significant in 42 of the 51 
markets), compared to an average value of 1.19 for national brands (statistically 
significant in 43 of the 51 markets)9. Similar to the short-run, the two effects are still very 
close to one another. In fact, Chow tests followed by use of the Delta Method to compare 
9 Recall that the null hypothesis for the long-run problem in this model is : =0, where {  ,  }; this non-linear hypothesis requires the Delta Method to 
test for significance, rather than a simple joint F-test, such as those used in the following two models. 
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the long-run price transmissions reveal in Table A12 that none of the 51 markets were 
significantly different at any conventional significance level. Hence, in the long-run, also, 
a change in the farm price affects private label retail prices by nearly the same amount as 
it affects national brand prices. 
Figure 4.1: Kernel Density Plot for  (“pl”),  (“br”), and   (“diff”). 
As seen in figure 4.1, the kernel density estimations of the contemporaneous 
effect (the coefficient on the current farm price) show that the distribution for private 
labels largely overlaps that of national brands (“pl” and “nb”, respectively). Furthermore, 




Re-estimating the model using seemingly unrelated regression equations, the 
coefficients differed by less than half a cent10, and  ranges from 0.04 to 0.88. However, 
SUR is necessary to capture the cross-equation error correlation when conducting Chow 
tests to assess the responses of private labels and national brands. The Chow tests 
indicated that the effect is significantly different for 8 markets at the 10% level or better, 
as seen in Table A3. Hence, we can conclude that, for a large majority of markets, the 
farm price is transmitted equivalently to private labels and national brands when 
assuming this model specification. 
 
4.2 Model 2 Results (PL vs NB) 
 With this model, we allow for asymmetry in the pass-through of farm prices. 
Table 4.2 presents the estimates and the calculated long run effects for increases and 
decreases in the farm price, ( ) + ( ) + ( ) + ( ) + ( ) (cumulative sum of all 
increases) and ( ) + ( ) + ( ) + ( ) + ( ) (cumulative sum of all decreases), 
respectively.  
Table 4.2: Model 2 Parameter Estimates (Equation (3) using PL and NB prices by 
market). 
 Private Label National Brand 
Variable Mean > 2 < 2 Random Mean > 2 < 2 Random 
 0.367 36 0 0.361 0.359 29 0 0.362 
 -0.188 0 6 -0.189 -0.174 1 7 -0.203 
 0.138 3 0 0.146 0.146 5 0 0.166 
10 This is not unexpected. Each equation has the exact same independent variables, save the lagged 
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 0.226 9 1 0.219 0.291 13 0 0.286 
 -0.091 1 5 -0.097 -0.120 2 6 -0.125 
 0.453 30 0 0.439 0.501 31 0 0.485 
 0.223 29 0 0.227 0.181 20 0 0.176 
 0.294 26 0 0.292 0.349 24 0 0.356 
 0.015 0 0 0.000 0.028 1 0 0.013 
 -0.094 0 1 -0.097 -0.096 0 3 -0.091 
 0.045 3 1 0.046 0.069 9 1 0.062 
 0.482 35 0 0.469 0.532 37 0 0.516 
 
Asymmetry is evident in the results, as the long-run effect of farm price decreases 
outweighs the long-run effect of farm price increases. The OLS  ranged from 0.25 to 
0.89 for this model run on private labels and from 0.19 to 0.80 for national brands. The 
 for the Swamy method is 0.21 for private labels, and 0.12 for national brands. 
 In table 4.2, the effect of a contemporaneous increase in the farm price yields a 
change of 0.37 in the private label retail price, and a 0.36 change in the national brand 
retail price. This effect is positive and significant in 36 markets for private labels and 29 
markets for national brands, but is never negative and significant. The long-run effect of 
farm price increases is about 0.45 for private labels, 0.50 for national brands. 
 For farm price decreases, the price transmission was slower than that of farm 
price increases. Looking at the short-run dynamics, we have that in the current period, a 
farm price decrease brings a change of 0.22 for private labels, and 0.18 for national 
brands, compared with 0.29 and 0.35, respectively, for farm price decreases in the 





For both retail prices, the effect of a decrease in farm prices has a larger 
magnitude than that of an increase in farm prices. However, the results still seem to be 
consistent (at least in the long-run problem) in that the difference between the effect for 
private labels and the effect for brands of increases is the same as the effect for private 
labels and the effect for brands of decreases (approximately a 5 cent difference in the 
long-run, even smaller in the short-run). Furthermore, the long-run effect is slightly 
greater for national brands than for private labels in all markets, and vice versa for short-
run effects. 
Figure 4.2. Kernel Density Plot for  ( )(“pl”),  ( )(“br”), and  ( )  ( )(“diff”). 
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Figure 4.3. Kernel Density Plot for  ( )(“pl”),  ( )(“br”), and  ( )  ( )(“diff”). 
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the distributions of the contemporaneous increases and 
decreases in the farm price; again, the distribution for private labels largely overlaps that 
of national brands, and the distribution of their difference is centered near 0. 
Estimating SUR, the  ranges from 0.19 to 0.89. Chow tests indicate the 
responses of private labels and national brands are significantly different for 8 markets at 
the 10% level or better. Results of these tests can be seen in Table A4, where the null 
hypothesis is that all coefficients (increases and decreases paired between private labels 
and national brands) are equal. This tells us that, in the short-run, the responses are no 
different in 43 of the 51 markets. Table A6 presents the test results of the null hypothesis 




markets at 10% significance or better. After comparing overall long-run effects, we 
exploit the model specification which separates increases in the farm price from 
decreases to test whether or not long-run increases in the farm price are passed through to 
private label prices in the same way to national brand prices. Table A7 shows that we 
reject this null hypothesis in 5 of the 51 markets at the 10% level or better. Similarly for 
long-run decreases in the farm price, Table A8 shows that we reject the null hypothesis in 
6 markets at the 10% level or better. Hence, we see very little empirical evidence that the 
retail prices of private labels and national brands respond to farm price shocks in a 
significantly different fashion – both in the long-run and the short-run. These small 
numbers of markets could arguably be what we would expect by pure chance. 
Since this model was developed as a test for asymmetric price transmission, we 
apply a joint F-test to all “increase” parameters and all “decrease” parameters, pairing the 
appropriate time periods. We find that for 36 of the 51 markets, the effect of farm price 
increases on private label retail prices is significantly different than the effect of farm 
price decreases at the 10% level or better, and 37 markets for national brands. While we 
use more markets and different data (for example, we are not accounting for fat content in 
milk) than Capps and Sherwell (2007), our results are in line with their findings on price 
transmission asymmetry in fluid milk markets. 
Looking back to table 4.2, the patterns of asymmetry are clear. In the current time 
period, the magnitude of the coefficient on a farm price increase is larger than that of a 
farm price decrease. This is the case for both private labels and national brands. Moving 





whereas the effect of a first lag on farm price decreases is still positive. What is 
noteworthy about this pattern is that it occurs in both cases – that of private labels and 
that of national brands. We also see similar patterns in market groupings across private 
labels and national brands for which a particular coefficient (or group of coefficients) is 
statistically significant. Another pattern seen in both cases is that after the first lag on 
farm price decreases, the significance of the effects dwindle, but for several time periods, 
the effects of farm price increases tend to linger. 
 
4.3 Model 3 Results (PL vs NB) 
 When estimating the third model, we are essentially looking for three things: 
whether or not the effect for private labels is different from the effect for national brands, 
asymmetry in the transmission (this model was, also, developed as a test for asymmetry), 
and evidence of cointegration (now that error correction terms are included – segmented 
into negative and positive terms  and , respectively). The OLS  for this 
model ranged from 0.26 to 0.91 for private labels and from 0.21 to 0.59 for national 





Table 4.3: Model 3 Parameter Estimates (Equation (4) using PL and NB Prices by 
Market). 
 Private Label National Brand 
Variable Mean > 2 < 2 Random Mean > 2 < 2 Random 
 0.409 43 0 0.400 0.392 39 0 0.399 
 -0.273 0 14 -0.310 -0.299 0 19 -0.266 
 0.049 3 0 0.057 0.034 2 0 0.062 
 0.174 7 1 0.252 0.246 11 0 0.175 
 -0.078 1 5 -0.135 -0.130 1 6 -0.081 
 0.282 23 0 0.264 0.242 14 0 0.290 
 0.193 21 0 0.147 0.152 16 0 0.197 
 0.222 18 0 0.284 0.265 21 0 0.228 
 -0.013 0 0 -0.017 -0.009 0 0 -0.020 
 -0.091 0 3 -0.112 -0.120 0 3 -0.092 
 0.009 0 2 0.037 0.037 3 0 0.007 
 0.389 25 0 0.340 0.324 19 0 0.320 
 -0.211 0 26 -0.255 -0.273 0 32 -0.184 
 -0.162 0 18 -0.135 -0.148 0 20 -0.145 
 
 Estimating OLS across the 51 markets, we observe the effect of a 
contemporaneous farm price increase to be 0.40 for private labels (positive and 
significant in 43 out of 51 markets), 0.40 for national brands (positive and significant in 
39 out of 51 markets). The long-run increases also have a similar pattern: 0.26 for private 
labels, and 0.29 for national brands.  
 When we look at table 4.3 with respect to decreasing farm prices, the point 
estimate on the current farm price decrease is 0.15 for private label, 0.20 for national 
brand (positive and significant in 21 and 16 out of 51 markets for private labels and 
national brands, respectively). The point estimate on the first lag of the farm price 




21 out of 51 markets for private labels and national brands, respectively). The long-run 
decreases for private labels is 0.34 for private labels and 0.32 for national brands. 
Asymmetry seems to be evident in the results seen in table 4.3. When performing 
joint F-tests on all increases and decreases (this time, including the segmented error 
correction terms), we find asymmetry11 in 41 out of 51 markets for private labels, and 43 
out of 51 markets for national brands. In fact, patterns similar to those in the second 
model appear in this model also, as seen in table 4.3. 
Figure 4.4: Kernel Density Plot for  ( )(“pl”),  ( )(“br”), and  ( )  ( )(“diff”). 
11 The general term, “asymmetry”, implies that we found the farm price increases to be statistically 




Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the kernel densities for the short-run effects of farm 
price shocks. As in model 2, the difference of the effects is centered close to 0. The long-
run effects (whose differences are also centered near 0) are in the appendix in figures B4 
and B5. 
Figure 4.5: Kernel Density Plot for  ( )(“pl”),  ( )(“br”), and  ( )  ( )(“diff”). 
The segmented error correction terms (in Table 4.3,  and  are the 
negative and positive error correction segmentations, respectively) show clear signs of 




sample of markets, and negative in all 51. This indicates that the retail prices are, in fact, 
below equilibrium and/or the farm prices are above equilibrium12 in the short-run. 
When we estimate the model using SUR, with  ranging from 0.21 to 0.92, the 
coefficients differed, again, very little from the OLS estimates. Once estimating SUR, we 
turn to Chow tests to test the responses of private labels and national brands. As seen in 
Table A5 Chow tests indicated that the contemporaneous effect is significantly different 
for 14 at the 10% level or better. Table A6 presents Chow test results where the null 
hypothesis is that, in the long-run, the overall effect of farm price shocks for private 
labels is significantly different from that of national brands. We reject this hypothesis in 
only 11 markets at the 10% level or better. 
Again, taking advantage of having increases and decreases accounted for 
separately, we look to Tables A7 and A8 show Chow test statistics and the corresponding 
p-values for testing the null hypothesis that the long-run increases and long-run 
decreases, respectively, are statistically different between private labels and national 
brands. As seen, we reject the null hypothesis in 8 markets in the farm price increases 
case and 6 markets in the farm price decreases case at the 10% level or better. This lends 
further evidence that, in the long run also, the effects of farm price shocks are equivalent 
for private labels and national brands in a large majority of US cities. 
 
12 The general term “equilibrium” refers to the long-run relationship between the farm and retail prices, if 
they are, in fact, cointegrated. 
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4.4 Model 1 Results (PL vs PL) 
 Using the same model specification and assumptions about the data, we apply the 
model on two new price series – private label retail prices of retailers for whom private 
labels are a relatively high share of sales (on average, about a 56:1 ratio of monthly 
private label sales to monthly branded sales), and private label retail prices of retailers for 
whom private labels are a relatively low share of sales (on average, about a 6:1 ratio of 
monthly private label sales to monthly branded sales). Rephrased, we examine the price-
setting behavior of retailers who feature national brands and those who emphasize more 
on private labels. 
  
Table 4.4: Model 1 Parameter Estimates (Equation (2) using PL Prices by Retailer). 
 Higher Share PL Lower Share PL 
Variable Estimate > 2 < 2 Estimate > 2 < 2 
 0.282 17 0 0.208 7 0 
 0.902 119 0 0.925 120 0 
 -0.550 0 94 -0.503 0 88 
 -0.171 0 7 -0.172 0 13 
 -0.342 0 54 -0.368 0 46 
 -0.091 0 1 -0.096 0 2 
 -0.098 1 1 -0.108 0 2 
 -0.488 8 2 -0.407 3 5 
 
In table 4.4, we see the results are very close (on average) between retailers who 
sell more national brand milk alongside private label milk and those that sell less branded 
milk alongside private label milk. The differences between the responses in the retail 





differences seen in the PL v NB case – very similar magnitudes and patterns in the 
coefficients and groupings in retailers for which the coefficients are significant. 
According to the model, a one dollar increase in the farm price is estimated to 
cause a 90 cent increase in the private label price of milk sold in stores that sell relatively 
more national brands versus a 92 cent increase in the private label price of milk sold in 
stores that sell relatively fewer brands: This contemporaneous effect is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level for every retailer but one for the high-share 
retailers and for all 120 low-share retailers (the long-run effect is hardly ever significant 
for both retailer types). Clearly, this effect differs very little between the two types of 
retailers. 
 
4.5 Model 2 Results (PL vs PL) 
 Recall that the model takes the form 
(3)          = +  ( ) ( ) +  ( ) ( ) +  
where  {  ,  }, 
( ) =  ,  >0, , 





Note that, in this instance, the index i takes on the values of retailers who promote 
national brands and those who don’t. That is, we are considering two types of retailers: 
those who sell relatively more national brands and those who sell relatively fewer 
national brands. As stated in the model 1 results, we may think of these retailers as 
having relatively low shares of private label sales, and relatively high shares of private 
label sales, respectively. 
 
Table 4.5: Model 2 Parameter Estimates (Equation (3) using PL Prices by Retailer). 
 Higher Share PL Lower Share PL 
Variable Estimate > 2 < 2 Estimate > 2 < 2 
 0.375 60 1 0.397 67 1 
 -0.216 2 24 -0.172 2 19 
 0.192 10 2 0.113 8 1 
 0.190 11 2 0.282 18 0 
 -0.105 1 10 -0.107 0 12 
 0.436 51 0 0.513 53 0 
 0.243 50 1 0.223 42 0 
 0.295 39 1 0.321 41 1 
 -0.014 4 3 0.053 3 2 
 -0.088 2 9 -0.145 1 10 
 0.028 8 6 0.095 17 3 
 0.463 55 0 0.547 57 0 
 
When we apply this model to the firm-level data, we get the output observed in 
table 4.5. The parameters on current farm price increases are similar for the two types of 
retailers – 0.37 for high-share retailers and 0.40 for low-share retailers. In the long-run, 
the effects of rising farm prices are 0.44 and 0.51, respectively. In both the short-run and 
long-run problems, we again see a pattern that we would expect to remain consistent with 
no strategic pricing against national brands via private labels, in terms of positive farm 





 Looking to falling farm prices, we see a pattern very similar to that of private 
label and national brand prices – between 39 and 50 markets of positive, significant 
effects for the current and 1-month lagged farm price decreases (0.24 & 0.29, 
respectively, for high-share retailers, and 0.22 & 0.32, respectively, for low-share 
retailers). In the long-run, farm price decreases give us changes of 0.46 and 0.55 for high-
share and low-share retailers, respectively. Just as seen above for farm price increases, 
negative shocks to the farm price pass through to the two types of retailers in a very 
similar fashion, both in the short-run and in the long-run. 
 Applying this model, it appears that in both the short-run and long-run problem, 
increases in the farm price are passed through to private label prices of one type of 
retailer very much like they are to the other type of retailer. The same holds with 
decreases in the farm price – the price transmission patterns are very similar. This shows 
little to no evidence of strategic pricing on the part of retailers, which is consistent with 
the results previously presented from comparing price transmissions to private label and 
national brand retail prices.  
 
4.6 Model 3 Results (PL vs PL) 
Finally, table 4.6 summarizes the estimation of model 3 for private labels between 
the two groups of retailers based on private labels as a relative share of sales. Similarly to 
the results found in table 4.3, there is clear evidence of cointegration between the retail 
prices (both private label in this instance) and the farm price for the market order in 





Table 4.6. Model 3 Parameter Estimates (Equation (4) using PL Prices by Retailer). 
 Higher Share PL Lower Share PL 
Variable Estimate > 2 < 2 Estimate > 2 < 2 
 0.447 78 0 0.473 80 0 
 0.447 1 43 -0.328 2 37 
 -0.370 3 1 -0.020 1 3 
 0.052 9 3 0.211 16 0 
 0.144 0 8 -0.115 0 10 
 0.167 36 0 0.221 26 0 
 0.197 37 1 0.178 28 0 
 0.188 29 1 0.214 32 2 
 -0.048 3 4 -0.001 3 1 
 -0.093 2 6 -0.149 0 12 
 0.003 3 4 0.043 3 3 
 0.246 41 0 0.284 31 0 
 -0.375 0 82 -0.352 0 80 
 -0.276 1 74 -0.278 0 71 
 
The effect of an immediate unit increase in the farm price is estimated to be 0.45 
for retailers with lower branded sales (significant for 80 out of 120 of this type of retailer) 
and 0.47 for retailers with higher branded sales (significant for 78 out of 120 of these 
retailers). In the long-run, the point estimates for high and low-share retailers are 0.17 
and 0.22, respectively (significant for 36 and 26 retailers, respectively). It appears that in 
both the short-run problem and the long-run problem, the retailers who sell relatively 
more branded milk tend to pass-through more of farm price increases to the price of their 
private label milk than do retailers who sell relatively less branded milk. However, it is 
the case that the effects differ by only about 0.05 in this instance, which indicates that, 






The coefficient on an immediate unit decrease in the farm price is estimated at 
0.20 for high-share retailers (positive and significant for 37 out of 120 retailers) and 0.18 
for low-share retailers (positive and significant for 28 out of 120 retailers). For a one 
month lag of a unit decrease in the farm price, the effect for high-share retailers is 0.19 
(positive, significant for 29 retailers) and 0.21 for low-share retailers (positive, significant 
for 32 retailers). The long-run effect is estimated to be 0.25 for high-share retailers and 
0.28 for low-share retailers. The only consistent pattern we observe here is that the effects 
are, on average, very close together. 
Evidently, in both the short-run and the long-run, two different retailer types who 
clearly face different relationships with branded products tend to respond in very similar 
fashions to equivalent changes in each of the wholesale prices of their respective private 
label products. This, also, is consistent with the previous lack of evidence of strategic 






CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
 
 
5.1 Private Label Retail Prices vs. National Brand Retail Prices 
 When estimating the price transmission parameters for private labels and national 
brands for every market, we see the same pattern across all three model specifications: 
the effect is, on average, the same for both labels of milk, private and branded. When 
calculating the difference of the pass-through of farm prices to private label retail prices 
and the pass-through to national brands, the distribution of the difference across the 51 
markets is centered directly at 0. Furthermore, when we investigate more formally using 
Chow tests, we saw the pass-through as statistically different for less than 15 of the 51 
markets in the Nielsen data. While these markets may provide more insight into the 
relationship between private labels and national brands, they are, at least, in the minority. 
 While there was evidence of cointegration between the farm and retail prices, and 
clear signs of asymmetry in the segmented error correction terms, the same pattern of 
asymmetry held for both private labels and national brands (negative speed of adjustment 
outweighed the positive, ie, the negative error correction segments had larger coefficients 
than the positive error correction segments). This indicates that, in a large number of 





As aforementioned, the results are robust to functional form specification. In 
every model, the farm price was passed through in the same way, regardless of the model 
we chose. Given that our data generating processes define our model specifications, our 
results are also robust to any assumptions we can make about the behavior of the data. 
 Our robust findings indicate the same conclusion in all three instances – we find 
little empirical evidence that retailers use private labels as a tool to strategically 
manipulate the prices of national brand products. We see the responses of private labels 
to shocks in the farm price are, at least on average, equivalent to those of national brand 
retail prices. If retailers were acting in a fashion similar to that laid out in the competitive 
view or the market segmentation view, it is reasonable to expect the responses (that is, 
the price changes made by the retailers) to be noticeably different. Empirically, that is not 
the case. 
 However, one should note that these results, while robust, are not infallible. In all 
three models, there are markets where there are significantly different responses from 
private labels and national brands. Indeed, as many as 14 markets – or 27% of our sample 
of 51 markets – bear evidence of retailers setting the two retail prices in a dissimilar 
fashion from one another, as was the case for the third model when comparing the two 







5.3 Private Labels from Different Types of Retailers 
 When we re-estimated all 3 models using the private label prices of two groups of 
retailers, we expected that if any strategy across labels was, in fact, taking place in stores 
in our data, then we would see evidence of differences across the two groups. The exact 
nature of is not important. Whether changes in private label prices caused the relative 
national brand price to go up or down is of no consequence; it is logical to anticipate 
retailers who sell more branded milk in their stores to adjust their prices differently than 
retailers who sell less. Assuming strategic pricing, we might expect changes in the farm 
price to be passed through to private label retail prices quite differently by the two types 
of firms.  
We found no empirical evidence of this. We find that, robust to model 
specification, the pass-through of farm prices to private labels with more competition 
from brands and private labels with less competition from brands appear to be very close 
to one another. On average, the farm price is passed through the same to both of these 
private label prices. This leads us to believe that retailers who sell more national brands 
respond to increased costs the same way that retailers who sell fewer national brands do. 
This is, at the very least, inconsistent with any theory that suggests that private labels 










 Given that we find very little empirical evidence consistent with strategic pricing 
by firms between private labels and national brands (such as the strategies presented in 
the two theories given at the outset of this paper), it would certainly appear that, at least 
in the case of fluid milk, (i) stores do not appear to use private labels as a strategic 
weapon on the market level, (ii) retailers who deal primarily with private label goods do 
not respond to farm price shocks any differently than retailers who promote both private 
labels and national brands. In other words, private labels and national brands do not seem 
to compete strategically– they are two versions of the same product. 
 The purpose of retailers carrying private labels could simply be because they are 
profitable. As mentioned before, retailers can avoid double marginalization with private 
labels and earn a wider margin on them. As a result, retailers have incentive not only to 
carry private labels but to feature them prominently, which could arguably be the driving 
reason behind the existence of private labels, rather than use as an instrument of 
competition. Private labels certainly dominate the fluid milk market, as stated at the 
outset of this paper, which is consistent with this argument.
 
 These implications would suggest that either we lose the information needed to 





the true underlying dynamics at play), and therefore we need firm-level data that has 
complete observations for the brands sold within each individual store to capture this 
relationship, or perhaps private labels do not, in fact, compete with national brands but 
across retailers. 
 In addition to these observations, another interesting factor that could help 
promote future study is container size. We used milk data sold only in gallons, but 
perhaps the competition between private labels and national brands comes into play for 
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Appendix A: Tables 
 
Table A1. Summary Statistics: Prices ($/oz) of 2% Milk in Gallons for Private 
Labels and National Brands in Chicago and Boston, 2004-2010. 
Chicago     
Brand Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
PL 1 0.021 0.002 0.016 0.025 
NB A sold in Store 1 0.022 0.004 0.016 0.030 
NB B sold in Store 1 0.029 0.002 0.024 0.031 
PL 2 0.018 0.003 0.013 0.024 
NB B sold in Store 2 0.029 0.002 0.024 0.031 
PL 3 0.018 0.004 0.008 0.031 
NB C sold in Store 3 0.018 0.002 0.015 0.024 
PL 4 0.022 0.003 0.016 0.028 
PL 5 0.017 0.002 0.012 0.022 
PL 6 0.020 0.005 0.013 0.028 
NB D sold in Store 6 0.022 0.006 0.015 0.031 
     
Boston     
PL 7 0.020 0.002 0.009 0.029 
NB E sold in Store 7 0.023 0.003 0.020 0.030 
NB F sold in Store 7 0.024 0.003 0.020 0.031 
PL 8 0.025 0.004 0.017 0.047 
NB E sold in Store 8 0.029 0.004 0.016 0.038 
NB F sold in Store 8 0.031 0.004 0.021 0.055 
PL 9 0.024 0.004 0.018 0.070 
NB E sold in Store 9 0.028 0.004 0.020 0.051 
NB F sold in Store 9 0.031 0.005 0.022 0.059 
PL 10 0.023 0.005 0.018 0.078 
NB E sold in Store 10 0.027 0.004 0.021 0.037 
  
Note: PL = Private Label, NB = National Brand; Store numbers correspond to PL 





Table A2. Market Level Summary Statistics for Private Label Retail Prices ($/FlOz) 



























BOSTON 0.0221 0.0021 0.0264 0.0190 0.0249 0.0030 0.0322 0.0213 
CHICAGO 0.0186 0.0020 0.0230 0.0156 0.0204 0.0023 0.0247 0.0163 
HOUSTON 0.0228 0.0029 0.0281 0.0165 0.0257 0.0023 0.0313 0.0218 
INDIANAPOLIS 0.0187 0.0025 0.0239 0.0152 0.0216 0.0025 0.0276 0.0171 
JACKSONVILLE 0.0264 0.0031 0.0332 0.0214 0.0238 0.0030 0.0304 0.0183 
KANSAS CITY 0.0228 0.0025 0.0275 0.0190 0.0238 0.0030 0.0296 0.0197 
LOS ANGELES 0.0208 0.0028 0.0272 0.0168 0.0229 0.0027 0.0301 0.0184 
SURBURBAN NY 0.0244 0.0024 0.0299 0.0205 0.0249 0.0029 0.0314 0.0212 
URBAN NY 0.0247 0.0027 0.0309 0.0197 0.0260 0.0027 0.0319 0.0218 
EXURBAN NY 0.0242 0.0023 0.0293 0.0201 0.0250 0.0025 0.0307 0.0210 
ORLANDO 0.0256 0.0030 0.0326 0.0215 0.0238 0.0030 0.0307 0.0192 
SAN FRANCISCO 0.0220 0.0029 0.0284 0.0184 0.0288 0.0033 0.0364 0.0232 
SEATTLE 0.0198 0.0022 0.0245 0.0166 0.0204 0.0025 0.0260 0.0168 
ATLANTA 0.0230 0.0041 0.0307 0.0161 0.0280 0.0033 0.0376 0.0213 
CINCINNATI 0.0187 0.0023 0.0233 0.0141 0.0220 0.0026 0.0287 0.0187 
CLEVELAND 0.0209 0.0028 0.0268 0.0161 0.0217 0.0025 0.0267 0.0184 
DALLAS 0.0216 0.0042 0.0287 0.0116 0.0264 0.0030 0.0334 0.0207 
DENVER 0.0212 0.0034 0.0264 0.0129 0.0203 0.0030 0.0249 0.0141 
DETROIT 0.0187 0.0029 0.0244 0.0129 0.0208 0.0022 0.0252 0.0177 
MIAMI 0.0258 0.0029 0.0324 0.0221 0.0242 0.0027 0.0304 0.0212 
MILWAUKEE 0.0200 0.0020 0.0238 0.0164 0.0220 0.0019 0.0265 0.0187 
MINNEAPOLIS 0.0202 0.0024 0.0248 0.0162 0.0243 0.0021 0.0288 0.0216 
NASHVILLE 0.0228 0.0027 0.0287 0.0184 0.0250 0.0026 0.0305 0.0207 
PHILADELPHIA 0.0257 0.0024 0.0306 0.0222 0.0255 0.0024 0.0307 0.0217 
PITTSBURGH 0.0231 0.0023 0.0284 0.0194 0.0248 0.0025 0.0297 0.0208 
PORTLAND, OR 0.0192 0.0022 0.0231 0.0163 0.0214 0.0027 0.0280 0.0179 
ST. LOUIS 0.0214 0.0025 0.0267 0.0174 0.0227 0.0026 0.0278 0.0189 
TAMPA 0.0257 0.0028 0.0318 0.0214 0.0242 0.0027 0.0300 0.0210 
BALTIMORE 0.0248 0.0022 0.0294 0.0216 0.0232 0.0027 0.0300 0.0191 
BIRMINGHAM 0.0249 0.0029 0.0309 0.0203 0.0266 0.0029 0.0329 0.0214 
BUFFALO-
ROCHESTER 0.0172 0.0029 0.0224 0.0133 0.0200 0.0028 0.0266 0.0169 
HARTFORD-
NEW HAVEN 0.0238 0.0021 0.0286 0.0203 0.0247 0.0029 0.0319 0.0199 
LITTLE ROCK 0.0241 0.0029 0.0301 0.0203 0.0257 0.0028 0.0311 0.0221 






MOBILE 0.0278 0.0026 0.0332 0.0230 0.0289 0.0030 0.0353 0.0231 
OKLAHOMA 
CITY-TULSA 0.0239 0.0027 0.0297 0.0200 0.0245 0.0026 0.0302 0.0206 
PHOENIX 0.0183 0.0026 0.0237 0.0142 0.0221 0.0025 0.0281 0.0188 
RALEIGH-
DURHAM 0.0262 0.0026 0.0302 0.0207 0.0241 0.0026 0.0293 0.0189 
SALT LAKE 
CITY 0.0179 0.0023 0.0229 0.0151 0.0189 0.0025 0.0242 0.0151 
COLUMBUS 0.0186 0.0023 0.0244 0.0149 0.0212 0.0024 0.0265 0.0179 
WASHINGTON, 
DC 0.0245 0.0022 0.0293 0.0215 0.0239 0.0024 0.0296 0.0199 
ALBANY 0.0223 0.0029 0.0293 0.0186 0.0235 0.0024 0.0289 0.0199 
CHARLOTTE 0.0254 0.0027 0.0297 0.0199 0.0244 0.0025 0.0299 0.0206 
DES MOINES 0.0208 0.0029 0.0269 0.0162 0.0217 0.0031 0.0277 0.0168 
GRAND RAPIDS 0.0189 0.0028 0.0246 0.0153 0.0215 0.0024 0.0264 0.0182 
LOUISVILLE 0.0197 0.0028 0.0257 0.0153 0.0242 0.0030 0.0309 0.0190 
OMAHA 0.0222 0.0025 0.0274 0.0175 0.0224 0.0026 0.0277 0.0183 
RICHMOND 0.0256 0.0031 0.0318 0.0194 0.0236 0.0025 0.0295 0.0192 
SACRAMENTO 0.0212 0.0028 0.0276 0.0174 0.0251 0.0029 0.0312 0.0201 
SAN ANTONIO 0.0247 0.0020 0.0307 0.0216 0.0249 0.0025 0.0302 0.0214 
SYRACUSE 0.0185 0.0026 0.0242 0.0157 0.0211 0.0027 0.0273 0.0167 
 






Table A3. Model 1 Chow Test comparing Net Effect of Farm Price Shocks on 
Private Label and National Brand Retail Prices. 
Model 1 – Chow Test :    
Obs MarketID F-Value Prob>F City 
1 50 3.71 0.0010 SACRAMENTO 
2 51 2.79 0.0094 SAN ANTONIO 
3 38 2.59 0.0152 PHOENIX 
4 35 2.22 0.0362 MEMPHIS 
5 5 2.13 0.0436 JACKSONVILLE 
6 26 2.07 0.0501 PORTLAND, OR 
7 17 2.03 0.0547 DALLAS 
8 2 1.80 0.0911 CHICAGO 
9 8 1.75 0.1017 SURBURBAN NY 
10 49 1.69 0.1170 RICHMOND 
11 44 1.60 0.1391 CHARLOTTE 
12 21 1.55 0.1550 MILWAUKEE 
13 7 1.51 0.1691 LOS ANGELES 
14 24 1.41 0.2044 PHILADELPHIA 
15 22 1.41 0.2049 MINNEAPOLIS 
16 30 1.38 0.2192 BALTIMORE 
17 42 1.32 0.2461 WASHINGTON, DC 
18 34 1.18 0.3167 LITTLE ROCK 
19 9 1.12 0.3510 URBAN NY 
20 12 1.10 0.3663 SAN FRANCISCO 
21 33 1.06 0.3957 HARTFORD-NEW HAVEN 
22 46 0.97 0.4543 GRAND RAPIDS 
23 39 0.97 0.4544 RALEIGH-DURHAM 
24 48 0.92 0.4895 OMAHA 
25 32 0.92 0.4909 BUFFALO-ROCHESTER 
26 1 0.90 0.5082 BOSTON 
27 29 0.83 0.5621 TAMPA 
28 45 0.82 0.5720 DES MOINES 
29 10 0.80 0.5857 EXURBAN NY 
30 6 0.77 0.6095 KANSAS CITY 
31 18 0.76 0.6176 DENVER 
32 41 0.75 0.6259 COLUMBUS 
33 43 0.74 0.6352 ALBANY 
34 37 0.73 0.6503 OKLAHOMA CITY-TULSA 
35 16 0.72 0.6548 CLEVELAND 





37 14 0.69 0.6824 ATLANTA 
38 3 0.65 0.7121 HOUSTON 
39 11 0.63 0.7289 ORLANDO 
40 28 0.60 0.7537 ST. LOUIS 
41 20 0.55 0.7942 MIAMI 
42 40 0.44 0.8789 SALT LAKE CITY 
43 36 0.40 0.8993 NEW ORLEANS-MOBILE 
44 25 0.39 0.9062 PITTSBURGH 
45 13 0.38 0.9110 SEATTLE 
46 52 0.38 0.9135 SYRACUSE 
47 31 0.38 0.9154 BIRMINGHAM 
48 19 0.34 0.9322 DETROIT 
49 23 0.26 0.9692 NASHVILLE 
50 4 0.25 0.9718 INDIANAPOLIS 






Table A4. Model 2 Chow Test comparing Net Effect of Farm Price Shocks on 
Private Label and National Brand Retail Prices. 
Model 2 – Chow Test :    
Obs MarketID F-Value Prob>F City 
1 7 2.87 0.0028 LOS ANGELES 
2 24 2.59 0.0067 PHILADELPHIA 
3 39 2.17 0.0235 RALEIGH-DURHAM 
4 11 2.10 0.0287 ORLANDO 
5 17 1.98 0.0407 DALLAS 
6 22 1.89 0.0514 MINNEAPOLIS 
7 2 1.83 0.0607 CHICAGO 
8 38 1.75 0.0751 PHOENIX 
9 45 1.59 0.1159 DES MOINES 
10 44 1.57 0.1220 CHARLOTTE 
11 14 1.56 0.1260 ATLANTA 
12 35 1.46 0.1602 MEMPHIS 
13 12 1.43 0.1753 SAN FRANCISCO 
14 30 1.38 0.1949 BALTIMORE 
15 50 1.35 0.2111 SACRAMENTO 
16 29 1.35 0.2129 TAMPA 
17 46 1.23 0.2793 GRAND RAPIDS 
18 13 1.22 0.2810 SEATTLE 
19 8 1.18 0.3091 SURBURBAN NY 
20 48 1.11 0.3599 OMAHA 
21 32 1.11 0.3628 BUFFALO-ROCHESTER 
22 34 1.07 0.3861 LITTLE ROCK 
23 5 1.07 0.3905 JACKSONVILLE 
24 28 1.06 0.3963 ST. LOUIS 
25 26 1.00 0.4484 PORTLAND, OR 
26 43 0.99 0.4549 ALBANY 
27 42 0.99 0.4555 WASHINGTON, DC 
28 40 0.98 0.4662 SALT LAKE CITY 
29 6 0.97 0.4751 KANSAS CITY 
30 16 0.93 0.5080 CLEVELAND 
31 49 0.90 0.5316 RICHMOND 
32 37 0.87 0.5634 OKLAHOMA CITY-TULSA 
33 33 0.86 0.5747 HARTFORD-NEW HAVEN 
34 52 0.86 0.5753 SYRACUSE 
35 20 0.76 0.6630 MIAMI 





37 18 0.67 0.7528 DENVER 
38 1 0.66 0.7617 BOSTON 
39 9 0.62 0.7972 URBAN NY 
40 15 0.59 0.8191 CINCINNATI 
41 19 0.58 0.8257 DETROIT 
42 3 0.55 0.8530 HOUSTON 
43 31 0.54 0.8607 BIRMINGHAM 
44 41 0.54 0.8624 COLUMBUS 
45 23 0.49 0.8929 NASHVILLE 
46 25 0.40 0.9452 PITTSBURGH 
47 4 0.39 0.9500 INDIANAPOLIS 
48 10 0.36 0.9612 EXURBAN NY 
49 21 0.32 0.9758 MILWAUKEE 
50 36 0.31 0.9778 NEW ORLEANS-MOBILE 





Table A5. Model 3 Chow Test comparing Net Effect of Farm Price Shocks on 
Private Label and National Brand Retail Prices. 
Model 3 – Chow Test :    
Obs MarketID F-Value Prob>F City 
1 7 5.31 0.0001 LOS ANGELES 
2 46 3.48 0.0002 GRAND RAPIDS 
3 50 2.50 0.0056 SACRAMENTO 
4 49 2.41 0.0074 RICHMOND 
5 25 2.39 0.0081 PITTSBURGH 
6 17 2.25 0.0127 DALLAS 
7 9 2.23 0.0136 URBAN NY 
8 5 2.08 0.0221 JACKSONVILLE 
9 38 2.05 0.0249 PHOENIX 
10 14 1.85 0.0464 ATLANTA 
11 8 1.83 0.0498 SURBURBAN NY 
12 42 1.79 0.0554 WASHINGTON, DC 
13 2 1.71 0.0709 CHICAGO 
14 20 1.69 0.0756 MIAMI 
15 33 1.57 0.1084 HARTFORD-NEW HAVEN 
16 35 1.45 0.1513 MEMPHIS 
17 41 1.39 0.1771 COLUMBUS 
18 16 1.35 0.1985 CLEVELAND 
19 44 1.35 0.2005 CHARLOTTE 
20 39 1.33 0.2074 RALEIGH-DURHAM 
21 48 1.33 0.2097 OMAHA 
22 24 1.28 0.2351 PHILADELPHIA 
23 23 1.27 0.2416 NASHVILLE 
24 19 1.26 0.2491 DETROIT 
25 1 1.22 0.2777 BOSTON 
26 32 1.20 0.2903 BUFFALO-ROCHESTER 
27 22 1.19 0.2950 MINNEAPOLIS 
28 13 1.16 0.3151 SEATTLE 
29 28 1.16 0.3200 ST. LOUIS 
30 45 1.16 0.3207 DES MOINES 
31 26 1.08 0.3811 PORTLAND, OR 
32 34 1.07 0.3935 LITTLE ROCK 
33 30 1.05 0.4043 BALTIMORE 
34 3 1.00 0.4527 HOUSTON 
35 40 0.99 0.4588 SALT LAKE CITY 





37 51 0.92 0.5251 SAN ANTONIO 
38 12 0.87 0.5808 SAN FRANCISCO 
39 15 0.86 0.5873 CINCINNATI 
40 52 0.86 0.5937 SYRACUSE 
41 18 0.84 0.6103 DENVER 
42 31 0.81 0.6445 BIRMINGHAM 
43 29 0.79 0.6551 TAMPA 
44 43 0.79 0.6634 ALBANY 
45 6 0.71 0.7429 KANSAS CITY 
46 37 0.70 0.7526 OKLAHOMA CITY-TULSA 
47 11 0.58 0.8573 ORLANDO 
48 10 0.57 0.8606 EXURBAN NY 
50 36 0.52 0.8963 NEW ORLEANS-MOBILE 
51 47 0.39 0.9650 LOUISVILLE 






Table A6. Model 2 Chow Test comparing Long run Effect of Farm Price Shocks on 
Private Label and National Brand Retail Prices. 
Model 2 – Chow Test :      =       
Obs MarketID F-Value Prob>F City 
1 11 6.29 0.0025 ORLANDO 
2 30 4.74 0.0103 BALTIMORE 
3 24 3.59 0.0303 PHILADELPHIA 
4 29 3.17 0.0450 TAMPA 
5 43 2.92 0.0572 ALBANY 
6 39 2.59 0.0791 RALEIGH-DURHAM 
7 28 2.24 0.1101 ST. LOUIS 
8 51 2.12 0.1239 SAN ANTONIO 
9 5 1.77 0.1749 JACKSONVILLE 
10 38 1.56 0.2139 PHOENIX 
11 52 1.52 0.2221 SYRACUSE 
12 48 1.32 0.2701 OMAHA 
13 34 1.16 0.3178 LITTLE ROCK 
14 20 1.15 0.3190 MIAMI 
15 8 1.09 0.3392 SURBURBAN NY 
16 12 1.01 0.3677 SAN FRANCISCO 
17 49 0.98 0.3793 RICHMOND 
18 42 0.87 0.4225 WASHINGTON, DC 
19 3 0.85 0.4315 HOUSTON 
20 19 0.73 0.4815 DETROIT 
21 23 0.70 0.5005 NASHVILLE 
22 9 0.70 0.5008 URBAN NY 
23 2 0.65 0.5221 CHICAGO 
24 44 0.63 0.5340 CHARLOTTE 
25 17 0.60 0.5518 DALLAS 
26 36 0.54 0.5834 NEW ORLEANS-MOBILE 
27 14 0.50 0.6048 ATLANTA 
28 45 0.47 0.6254 DES MOINES 
29 35 0.46 0.6315 MEMPHIS 
30 10 0.43 0.6500 EXURBAN NY 
31 41 0.40 0.6733 COLUMBUS 
32 26 0.39 0.6769 PORTLAND, OR 
33 18 0.39 0.6812 DENVER 
34 32 0.36 0.6992 BUFFALO-ROCHESTER 





36 16 0.27 0.7634 CLEVELAND 
37 22 0.26 0.7743 MINNEAPOLIS 
38 37 0.20 0.8176 OKLAHOMA CITY-TULSA 
39 4 0.19 0.8273 INDIANAPOLIS 
40 46 0.16 0.8528 GRAND RAPIDS 
41 21 0.12 0.8835 MILWAUKEE 
42 25 0.10 0.9079 PITTSBURGH 
43 40 0.09 0.9103 SALT LAKE CITY 
44 31 0.09 0.9120 BIRMINGHAM 
45 13 0.05 0.9535 SEATTLE 
46 15 0.04 0.9602 CINCINNATI 
47 1 0.04 0.9617 BOSTON 
48 50 0.03 0.9739 SACRAMENTO 
49 7 0.02 0.9768 LOS ANGELES 
50 33 0.02 0.9776 HARTFORD-NEW HAVEN 






Table A7. Model 2 Chow Test comparing Long run Effect of Farm Price Shocks on 
Private Label and National Brand Retail Prices. 
Model 2 – Chow Test :      =       
Obs MarketID F-Value Prob>F City 
1 30 7.67 0.0064 BALTIMORE 
2 29 4.76 0.031 TAMPA 
3 28 4.11 0.0447 ST. LOUIS 
4 43 3.24 0.0741 ALBANY 
5 11 2.75 0.0996 ORLANDO 
6 24 2.46 0.1188 PHILADELPHIA 
7 38 2.46 0.1193 PHOENIX 
8 8 2.09 0.151 SURBURBAN NY 
9 12 2.01 0.1587 SAN FRANCISCO 
10 34 1.93 0.1673 LITTLE ROCK 
11 19 1.47 0.2275 DETROIT 
12 9 1.37 0.2433 URBAN NY 
13 20 1.37 0.2437 MIAMI 
14 2 1.06 0.3049 CHICAGO 
15 36 1.04 0.3092 NEW ORLEANS-MOBILE 
16 14 1.01 0.3171 ATLANTA 
17 39 0.98 0.324 RALEIGH-DURHAM 
18 52 0.75 0.3878 SYRACUSE 
19 49 0.74 0.3925 RICHMOND 
20 51 0.61 0.4352 SAN ANTONIO 
21 35 0.59 0.4439 MEMPHIS 
22 42 0.54 0.4648 WASHINGTON, DC 
23 18 0.46 0.4974 DENVER 
24 22 0.43 0.5146 MINNEAPOLIS 
25 16 0.39 0.5322 CLEVELAND 
26 48 0.39 0.5348 OMAHA 
27 17 0.3 0.5851 DALLAS 
28 4 0.26 0.6087 INDIANAPOLIS 
29 32 0.26 0.6096 BUFFALO-ROCHESTER 
30 23 0.26 0.6124 NASHVILLE 
31 46 0.2 0.6589 GRAND RAPIDS 
32 25 0.19 0.661 PITTSBURGH 
33 44 0.19 0.6621 CHARLOTTE 
34 5 0.19 0.6644 JACKSONVILLE 





36 41 0.16 0.6913 COLUMBUS 
37 40 0.08 0.7818 SALT LAKE CITY 
38 21 0.07 0.7869 MILWAUKEE 
39 10 0.06 0.8076 EXURBAN NY 
40 26 0.05 0.8302 PORTLAND, OR 
41 45 0.04 0.8428 DES MOINES 
42 6 0.03 0.8532 KANSAS CITY 
43 15 0.02 0.8989 CINCINNATI 
44 50 0.01 0.9337 SACRAMENTO 
45 7 0.00 0.9466 LOS ANGELES 
46 47 0.00 0.9615 LOUISVILLE 
47 31 0.00 0.9645 BIRMINGHAM 
48 1 0.00 0.9841 BOSTON 
49 37 0.00 0.9895 OKLAHOMA CITY-TULSA 
50 13 0.00 0.9902 SEATTLE 






Table A8. Model 2 Chow Test comparing Long run Effect of Farm Price Shocks on 
Private Label and National Brand Retail Prices. 
Model 2 – Chow Test :      =       
Obs MarketID F-Value Prob>F City 
1 30 8.34 0.0045 BALTIMORE 
2 29 5.22 0.0239 TAMPA 
3 43 3.81 0.0531 ALBANY 
4 11 3.72 0.0557 ORLANDO 
5 28 3.72 0.0558 ST. LOUIS 
6 24 3.16 0.0778 PHILADELPHIA 
7 38 2.71 0.1021 PHOENIX 
8 8 2.15 0.1446 SURBURBAN NY 
9 12 1.87 0.1736 SAN FRANCISCO 
10 34 1.75 0.1885 LITTLE ROCK 
11 19 1.45 0.2306 DETROIT 
12 39 1.41 0.2371 RALEIGH-DURHAM 
13 9 1.39 0.2405 URBAN NY 
14 20 1.17 0.2818 MIAMI 
15 36 1.07 0.3024 NEW ORLEANS-MOBILE 
16 52 1.02 0.3133 SYRACUSE 
17 14 0.99 0.3209 ATLANTA 
18 51 0.94 0.3328 SAN ANTONIO 
19 2 0.94 0.3347 CHICAGO 
20 49 0.93 0.3374 RICHMOND 
21 42 0.70 0.4037 WASHINGTON, DC 
22 35 0.67 0.4136 MEMPHIS 
23 48 0.66 0.4185 OMAHA 
24 16 0.44 0.5072 CLEVELAND 
25 22 0.38 0.5386 MINNEAPOLIS 
26 23 0.37 0.5439 NASHVILLE 
27 18 0.36 0.5475 DENVER 
28 32 0.33 0.5655 BUFFALO-ROCHESTER 
29 4 0.30 0.5849 INDIANAPOLIS 
30 44 0.29 0.5914 CHARLOTTE 
31 3 0.27 0.6022 HOUSTON 
32 46 0.23 0.6331 GRAND RAPIDS 
33 17 0.20 0.6546 DALLAS 
34 25 0.19 0.6620 PITTSBURGH 





36 21 0.10 0.7526 MILWAUKEE 
37 26 0.10 0.7581 PORTLAND, OR 
38 41 0.09 0.7587 COLUMBUS 
39 5 0.07 0.7869 JACKSONVILLE 
40 15 0.02 0.8773 CINCINNATI 
41 10 0.02 0.8778 EXURBAN NY 
42 7 0.01 0.9138 LOS ANGELES 
43 6 0.01 0.9318 KANSAS CITY 
44 31 0.01 0.9319 BIRMINGHAM 
45 45 0.01 0.9411 DES MOINES 
46 37 0.00 0.9449 OKLAHOMA CITY-TULSA 
47 47 0.00 0.9566 LOUISVILLE 
48 13 0.00 0.9630 SEATTLE 
49 50 0.00 0.9707 SACRAMENTO 
50 33 0.00 0.9877 HARTFORD-NEW HAVEN 






Table A9. Model 3 Chow Test comparing Long run Effect of Farm Price Shocks on 
Private Label and National Brand Retail Prices. 
Model 3 – Chow Test :      =       
Obs MarketID F-Value Prob>F City 
1 14 5.00 0.0081 ATLANTA 
2 42 4.90 0.0089 WASHINGTON, DC 
3 7 4.40 0.0141 LOS ANGELES 
4 49 4.33 0.0151 RICHMOND 
5 25 4.31 0.0154 PITTSBURGH 
6 38 3.25 0.0419 PHOENIX 
7 41 3.04 0.0512 COLUMBUS 
8 51 2.87 0.0605 SAN ANTONIO 
9 19 2.86 0.0612 DETROIT 
10 30 2.47 0.0889 BALTIMORE 
11 28 2.46 0.0893 ST. LOUIS 
12 17 2.20 0.1151 DALLAS 
13 34 2.18 0.1176 LITTLE ROCK 
14 26 2.11 0.1248 PORTLAND, OR 
15 20 1.97 0.1435 MIAMI 
16 48 1.81 0.1680 OMAHA 
17 32 1.80 0.1702 BUFFALO-ROCHESTER 
18 36 1.64 0.1971 NEW ORLEANS-MOBILE 
19 46 1.64 0.1976 GRAND RAPIDS 
20 39 1.62 0.2022 RALEIGH-DURHAM 
21 43 1.56 0.2134 ALBANY 
22 29 1.46 0.2358 TAMPA 
23 24 1.33 0.2687 PHILADELPHIA 
24 1 1.24 0.2938 BOSTON 
25 23 1.22 0.2990 NASHVILLE 
26 33 1.18 0.3101 HARTFORD-NEW HAVEN 
27 9 1.18 0.3108 URBAN NY 
28 35 1.17 0.3148 MEMPHIS 
29 8 1.09 0.3395 SURBURBAN NY 
30 22 1.09 0.3403 MINNEAPOLIS 
31 31 1.08 0.3418 BIRMINGHAM 
32 50 1.05 0.3537 SACRAMENTO 
33 5 0.98 0.3779 JACKSONVILLE 
34 18 0.94 0.3950 DENVER 





36 45 0.72 0.4871 DES MOINES 
37 13 0.63 0.5327 SEATTLE 
38 2 0.62 0.5376 CHICAGO 
39 44 0.46 0.6303 CHARLOTTE 
40 10 0.44 0.6426 EXURBAN NY 
41 11 0.36 0.6971 ORLANDO 
42 6 0.36 0.7012 KANSAS CITY 
43 16 0.30 0.7405 CLEVELAND 
44 4 0.28 0.7554 INDIANAPOLIS 
45 47 0.26 0.7704 LOUISVILLE 
46 40 0.24 0.7876 SALT LAKE CITY 
47 15 0.15 0.8606 CINCINNATI 
48 52 0.11 0.8940 SYRACUSE 
49 37 0.05 0.9489 OKLAHOMA CITY-TULSA 
50 21 0.01 0.9935 MILWAUKEE 






Table A10. Model 3 Chow Test comparing Long run Effect of Farm Price Shocks on 
Private Label and National Brand Retail Prices. 
Model 3 – Chow Test :      =       
Obs MarketID F-Value Prob>F City 
1 7 8.46 0.0043 LOS ANGELES 
2 41 5.46 0.0210 COLUMBUS 
3 25 5.13 0.0252 PITTSBURGH 
4 19 4.56 0.0345 DETROIT 
5 28 4.04 0.0464 ST. LOUIS 
6 14 3.99 0.0478 ATLANTA 
7 38 3.38 0.0682 PHOENIX 
8 17 2.93 0.0891 DALLAS 
9 29 2.57 0.1117 TAMPA 
10 1 2.47 0.1188 BOSTON 
11 49 2.04 0.1553 RICHMOND 
12 50 1.93 0.1673 SACRAMENTO 
13 42 1.86 0.1751 WASHINGTON, DC 
14 43 1.72 0.1922 ALBANY 
15 22 1.71 0.1933 MINNEAPOLIS 
16 46 1.57 0.2120 GRAND RAPIDS 
17 51 1.57 0.2131 SAN ANTONIO 
18 9 1.51 0.2217 URBAN NY 
19 23 1.40 0.2392 NASHVILLE 
20 34 1.31 0.2548 LITTLE ROCK 
21 30 1.12 0.2919 BALTIMORE 
22 39 1.03 0.3128 RALEIGH-DURHAM 
23 2 1.02 0.3149 CHICAGO 
24 12 1.02 0.3150 SAN FRANCISCO 
25 35 0.76 0.3842 MEMPHIS 
26 8 0.73 0.3929 SURBURBAN NY 
27 5 0.73 0.3943 JACKSONVILLE 
28 44 0.68 0.4104 CHARLOTTE 
29 10 0.47 0.4953 EXURBAN NY 
30 33 0.43 0.5135 HARTFORD-NEW HAVEN 
31 48 0.41 0.5214 OMAHA 
32 18 0.31 0.5790 DENVER 
33 15 0.27 0.6026 CINCINNATI 
34 36 0.27 0.6063 NEW ORLEANS-MOBILE 





36 31 0.19 0.6642 BIRMINGHAM 
37 40 0.17 0.6848 SALT LAKE CITY 
38 24 0.16 0.6875 PHILADELPHIA 
39 4 0.16 0.6925 INDIANAPOLIS 
40 45 0.13 0.7194 DES MOINES 
41 16 0.08 0.7781 CLEVELAND 
42 11 0.08 0.7798 ORLANDO 
43 37 0.07 0.7853 OKLAHOMA CITY-TULSA 
44 20 0.05 0.8155 MIAMI 
45 26 0.03 0.8591 PORTLAND, OR 
46 13 0.02 0.8924 SEATTLE 
47 21 0.01 0.9142 MILWAUKEE 
48 32 0.01 0.9247 BUFFALO-ROCHESTER 
49 47 0.01 0.9386 LOUISVILLE 
50 6 0.00 0.9887 KANSAS CITY 






Table A11. Model 3 Chow Test comparing Long run Effect of Farm Price Shocks on 
Private Label and National Brand Retail Prices. 
Model 3 – Chow Test :      =       
Obs MarketID F-Value Prob>F City 
1 7 8.81 0.0036 LOS ANGELES 
2 28 4.89 0.0287 ST. LOUIS 
3 41 4.59 0.0340 COLUMBUS 
4 25 3.63 0.0588 PITTSBURGH 
5 19 3.51 0.0634 DETROIT 
6 29 2.92 0.0898 TAMPA 
7 43 2.43 0.1218 ALBANY 
8 30 2.31 0.1312 BALTIMORE 
9 1 2.12 0.1475 BOSTON 
10 17 1.90 0.1700 DALLAS 
11 38 1.70 0.1942 PHOENIX 
12 50 1.51 0.2211 SACRAMENTO 
13 5 1.37 0.2439 JACKSONVILLE 
14 14 1.28 0.2592 ATLANTA 
15 8 1.23 0.2701 SURBURBAN NY 
16 2 1.23 0.2702 CHICAGO 
17 22 1.15 0.2846 MINNEAPOLIS 
18 36 1.13 0.2901 NEW ORLEANS-MOBILE 
19 9 1.04 0.3086 URBAN NY 
20 46 1.02 0.3136 GRAND RAPIDS 
21 44 0.88 0.3501 CHARLOTTE 
22 45 0.75 0.3895 DES MOINES 
23 33 0.72 0.3973 HARTFORD-NEW HAVEN 
24 12 0.69 0.4093 SAN FRANCISCO 
25 23 0.65 0.4216 NASHVILLE 
26 10 0.60 0.4418 EXURBAN NY 
27 49 0.51 0.4781 RICHMOND 
28 39 0.45 0.5048 RALEIGH-DURHAM 
29 32 0.39 0.5346 BUFFALO-ROCHESTER 
30 51 0.39 0.5351 SAN ANTONIO 
31 15 0.30 0.5872 CINCINNATI 
32 42 0.28 0.5996 WASHINGTON, DC 
33 52 0.22 0.6381 SYRACUSE 
34 16 0.22 0.6388 CLEVELAND 





36 37 0.10 0.7515 OKLAHOMA CITY-TULSA 
37 47 0.09 0.7696 LOUISVILLE 
38 35 0.09 0.7705 MEMPHIS 
39 6 0.08 0.7720 KANSAS CITY 
40 20 0.08 0.7735 MIAMI 
41 4 0.08 0.7818 INDIANAPOLIS 
42 31 0.07 0.7956 BIRMINGHAM 
43 40 0.06 0.7996 SALT LAKE CITY 
44 24 0.06 0.8071 PHILADELPHIA 
45 26 0.05 0.8214 PORTLAND, OR 
46 18 0.02 0.8851 DENVER 
47 48 0.02 0.8998 OMAHA 
48 21 0.01 0.9197 MILWAUKEE 
49 13 0.01 0.9264 SEATTLE 
50 11 0.01 0.9397 ORLANDO 






Table A12. Model 1 Chow Test comparing Long run Effect of Farm Price Shocks on 
Private Label and National Brand Retail Prices. 
Model 1 – Chow Test :      =       
Obs MarketID F-Value Prob>F City 
1 30 2.02 0.1606 BALTIMORE 
2 8 1.27 0.2633 SURBURBAN NY 
3 7 1.15 0.2868 LOS ANGELES 
4 51 1.10 0.2985 SAN ANTONIO 
5 50 0.92 0.3400 SACRAMENTO 
6 43 0.90 0.3459 ALBANY 
7 4 0.81 0.3718 INDIANAPOLIS 
8 44 0.76 0.3879 CHARLOTTE 
9 5 0.55 0.4616 JACKSONVILLE 
10 15 0.55 0.4627 CINCINNATI 
11 35 0.54 0.4664 MEMPHIS 
12 28 0.49 0.4848 ST. LOUIS 
13 48 0.38 0.5379 OMAHA 
14 22 0.37 0.5434 MINNEAPOLIS 
15 20 0.37 0.5456 MIAMI 
16 9 0.36 0.5502 URBAN NY 
17 6 0.35 0.5580 KANSAS CITY 
18 47 0.31 0.5816 LOUISVILLE 
19 31 0.26 0.6090 BIRMINGHAM 
20 17 0.25 0.6162 DALLAS 
21 11 0.24 0.6234 ORLANDO 
22 16 0.21 0.6515 CLEVELAND 
23 37 0.20 0.6570 OKLAHOMA CITY-TULSA 
24 21 0.19 0.6604 MILWAUKEE 
25 36 0.18 0.6753 NEW ORLEANS-MOBILE 
26 12 0.14 0.7111 SAN FRANCISCO 
27 3 0.14 0.7128 HOUSTON 
28 29 0.13 0.7153 TAMPA 
29 34 0.13 0.7196 LITTLE ROCK 
30 42 0.12 0.7323 WASHINGTON, DC 
31 18 0.11 0.7377 DENVER 
32 52 0.10 0.7584 SYRACUSE 
33 23 0.09 0.7600 NASHVILLE 
34 49 0.09 0.7611 RICHMOND 





36 26 0.09 0.7669 PORTLAND, OR 
37 14 0.08 0.7729 ATLANTA 
38 25 0.08 0.7745 PITTSBURGH 
39 33 0.08 0.7795 HARTFORD-NEW HAVEN 
40 1 0.08 0.7833 BOSTON 
41 32 0.05 0.8199 BUFFALO-ROCHESTER 
42 10 0.05 0.8208 EXURBAN NY 
43 45 0.05 0.8307 DES MOINES 
44 2 0.05 0.8308 CHICAGO 
45 39 0.04 0.8493 RALEIGH-DURHAM 
46 19 0.01 0.9233 DETROIT 
47 24 0.01 0.9293 PHILADELPHIA 
48 38 0.01 0.9439 PHOENIX 
49 46 0.00 0.9614 GRAND RAPIDS 
50 13 0.00 0.9794 SEATTLE 







Appendix B: Figures 
 
 
Figure B1. Average Monthly Retail Prices and Regional Farm Price ($/FlOz) for Milk 
sold in Gallons, Boston, January 2004-December 2010 (source: Author’s Calculations 






Figure B2. Average Monthly Retail Prices and Regional Farm Price ($/FlOz) for Milk 
sold in Gallons, Indianapolis, January 2004-December 2010 (source: Author’s 






Figure B3. Average Monthly Retail Prices and Regional Farm Price ($/FlOz) for Milk 
sold in Gallons, San Francisco, January 2004-December 2010 (source: Author’s 




Figure B4: Kernel Density Plot for   ( )(“pli”),   ( )(“bri”), and   ( )    ( )(“diffi”). 
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Figure B5: Kernel Density Plot for   ( )(“pld”),   ( ) (“brd”), and   ( )    ( )(“diffd”). 
 
